Class papers often include a title page, but consult with your instructor (it's acceptable to include the title on the first page of text). The title should be centered a third of the way down the page, and your name and class information should follow several lines later. When subtitles apply, end the title with a colon and place the subtitle on the line below the title. Different practices apply for theses and dissertations (see Kate L. Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* [7th ed.], 373-408).

Blue boxes contain directions for writing and citing in Chicago's Author-Date References style.

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Margins should be set at no less than 1" and no greater than 1.5. Margins in this sample paper have been set at 1.25 to accommodate explanatory comment boxes.

The recommended typeface is something readable, such as Times New Roman or Palatino. Use no less than ten-point type, but the preference is for twelve-point. Most importantly, be consistent.

Margins should be set at no less than 1" and no greater than 1.5. Margins in this sample paper have been set at 1.25 to accommodate explanatory comment boxes.
In *Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies*, Jodi Dean (2009) argues that "imagining a rhizome might be nice, but rhizomes don’t describe the underlying structure of real networks" (30), rejecting the idea that there is such a thing as a nonhierarchical interconnectedness that structures our contemporary world and means of communication. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009), on the other hand, argue that the Internet is an exemplar of the rhizome: a nonhierarchical, noncentered network—a democratic network with “an indeterminate and potentially unlimited number of interconnected nodes [that] communicate with no central point of control” (299). What is at stake in settling this dispute? Being. And, knowledge and power in that being. More specifically, this paper explores how a theory of social ontology has evolved to theories of social ontologies, how the modernist notion of global understanding of individuals working toward a common (rationalized and objectively knowable) goal became pluralistic postmodern theories embracing the idea of local networks. Furthermore, what this summary journey of theoretical evolution allows for is a consideration of why understandings of a world comprising emergent networks need be of concern to composition instructors and their practical activities in the classroom: networks produce knowledge.

Our journey begins with early modernism, and if early modernism had a theme, it was oneness. This focus on oneness or unity, on the whole rather than on individual parts, derived from Enlightenment thinking: “The project [of modernity] amounted to an extraordinary intellectual effort on the part of Enlightenment thinkers to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic.” Science, so the story went, stood as inherently objective inquiry that could...
reveal truth—universal truth at that. Enlightenment thinkers, such as Kant, believed in the “universal, eternal, and . . . immutable qualities of all of humanity” (Harvey 1990, 12); by extension, “equality, liberty, faith in human intelligence . . . and universal reason” were widely held beliefs and seen as unifying forces (13). In fact, Kant ([1784] 1983) believed that Enlightenment (freedom from self-imposed immaturity, otherwise known as the ability to use one’s understanding on his or her own toward greater ends) (41) was a divine right (44) bestowed upon and meant to be exercised by the masses. Later modernists began to acknowledge the fragmentation, ambiguity and larger chaos that characterized modern life (Harvey 1990, 22) but, perhaps ironically, only so they might better reconcile their disunified state. This later modernism was labeled “heroic” modernism and was based on the precedent set by romantic thinkers and artists, which accounted for the “unbridled individualism of great thinkers, the great benefactors of humankind, who through their singular efforts and struggles would push reason and civilization willy-nilly to the point of true emancipation” (14). Yet heroic modernists still seemed to ascribe to the overall Enlightenment project that suggested that there exists a “true nature of a unified, though complex, underlying reality” (30). Even the latest “high” modernists believed in “linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders under standardized conditions of knowledge and production” (35).

Ultimately, modernism was about individuals moving in assembly-line fashion toward a (rational and inherently unified) common goal. This ontological understanding rested on what Lyotard would call a “grand narrative.”
Lyotard (1984) sees “modern” as fit for describing “any science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectic of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth” (xxiii); in other words, Lyotard characterizes “modernism” as a hegemonic story that defined and guided the ways in which humans lived their lives. Further, Lyotard defines “postmodernism” as “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv). Lyotard is not suggesting that totalizing narratives suddenly stopped existing in our postmodern world but that they no longer carry the same currency or usefulness to the people creating and living by and through them. One of the key theoretical understandings driving this change is that, according to Lyotard, postmodern knowledge is not “a tool of the authorities” as knowledge (specifically, scientific knowledge) may have been for the moderns; postmodern knowledge allows for a sensitivity to differences and helps us accept those differences rather than proffers a driving urge to eradicate or otherwise unify them (xxv). Lyotard notes that science, then, no longer has the power to legitimate other narratives (40); it can no longer be understood to be the world’s singular metalanguage because it has been “replaced by the principle of a plurality of formal and axiomatic systems capable of arguing the truth of denotative statements . . . ” (43). Lyotard is invested in these (deliberately plural) systems, these “little narratives” (61) that operate locally and according to specific rules, and he calls them “language games.” The modern (or, more accurately, postmodern) world is too complex to be understood beneath the aegis of one totalizing system, one goal imposed through one grand narrative: “There is no reason to
think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all of these language games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific community could embrace the totality of metaprescription regulating the totality of statements circulating in the social collectivity” (65). Paralogy, learning how to play by and/or to challenge the rules of a specific language game is the means fit for postmodernity, not consensus, according to Lyotard (66). Ultimately, in his invocation of plural systems rather than a singular system, Lyotard’s attitude toward grand narratives invites a way of thinking and a way of understanding the world with inferences of a networked logic. Stephen Toulmin, too, tackles an understanding of contemporary sociality based on (competing) systems rather than a singular hegemonic system.

In *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, Toulmin (1990) challenges us to consider how such different systems, different ways of viewing the world, come to hold sway at different points in time. Like Lyotard, he suggests that we cannot simply do away with grand narratives but that we are making progress if we interrogate how and why they came to be as well as accede to the fact that there might be more than one way of interpreting those seemingly domineering capital “S” Systems. Additionally, Toulmin discounts the vocabulary of narratives (grand or not) and games and instead prefers the term “cosmopolis.” “Cosmopolis,” according to Toulmin, invokes notions of nature and society in relationship to one another; more specifically, a cosmopolis is not a thing in and of itself (it is not nature, it is not society, it is not a story, and it is not a game) but a process, an ordering of nature and society (67-68). Unlike the seemingly stable cosmopolis of modernity that Kant and others present, Toulmin suggests that
cosmopolises are always in flux because communities continually converse in an effort to shape and reshape their understanding of their ways of being in their universe. Dominant cosmopolises do emerge to characterize a particular state of persons at a particular time, but that should not prevent us, argues Toulmin, from reading into the dominant rather than with it. Dissensus, then, has a place in Toulmin’s postmodern understanding, too, just as in Lyotard’s. We might, in fact, suggest that Lyotard and Toulmin both see the world in its interconnected and localized intricacies but use different language to forward their unique interests. While Lyotard is out to critique Habermas and his insistence on the value of consensus, Toulmin seeks to disrupt the common narrative of modernity as whole by interrogating its structuring features. What we need ultimately note is that Lyotard’s and Toulmin’s ontological commonalities are interrogated by another important thinker, Michel Foucault.

In “What is Enlightenment,” Foucault (1984d) writes, “Thinking back on Kant’s text, I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by ‘attitude,’ I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task” (39). Foucault (1984a), too, questions that there ever was some objective means to an end of unified truth; rather, Foucault suggests that the moderns voluntarily embraced and enacted that vision. Foucault’s unique contribution, however, was to suggest that a “disciplinary” society most accurately described the way contemporaries were relating, acting, thinking and feeling their world.
Rather than a voluntary and even blind acceptance of any such vision, Foucault suggests that a metacognitive understanding or metawareness of the way power flowed in our disciplinary society would make room for resistance, despite the bleak picture that he often gets accused of painting. We may say “bleak” as Foucault writes that “discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as object and as instruments of its exercise” (188). This is a far cry from Descartes nostalgic “I think; therefore, I am” that informed the Enlightenment and most of modernism’s utopian vision of powerful individuals coexisting in a perfectly rationalized, truthful, and unified world.

In his grand splitting from Descartes and other Enlightenment and modernist thinkers, Foucault (1984a) suggests that the instruments of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination are what drives our contemporary disciplinary society (188). He asks us to consider how seemingly mundane and beneficent institutions as hospitals and schools (and also asylums and prisons) enact these instruments. Even architecturally, he insists, these institutions are built to “permit internal, articulated and detailed control . . . to make it possible to know [individuals], to alter them” (190). Such systems work as networks, according to Foucault: “[disciplinary society’s] functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network ‘holds’ the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised.” Yes, this represents a hierarchical network (hospitals and schools have administrators, asylums and prisons have their own care staff and guards,
too), but the important thing Foucault wants us to remember is that power is never possessed; it *flows* “like a piece of machinery” through the network (192).

Further, Foucault (1984a) suggests that the threat of penalty lies at the heart of a disciplinary system (193). It is a “perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions”; that penalty “compares, differentiates, hierarchies, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes*” (195). In the end the disciplinary system is interested in creating well-behaved objects (not subjects, *per se*). It does the work of unification and disunification at the same time: “In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity, but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another” (197). A disciplinary society is interested in producing citizens that will *perform productively*. But, in addition to observation or surveillance and normalizing judgment, such an end can only be accomplished through examination, which goes hand-in-hand with documentation: “It engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them” (201). This turns us as individuals into “cases”: “It is the individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.” (203).

Ultimately for Foucault, “Power was the great network of political relationships among all things,” (Thomas 2008, 153), and Foucault (1984a) represents a powerful figure in postmodern thought because he asserts that power is what produces our reality; a hierarchical network of power is our contemporary ontology: “In fact, power produces; it
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (205). Foucault has a grand legacy of sorts, no doubt, but that does not mean his work has not been challenged or, perhaps more accurately, extended.

Nikolas Rose (1999), author of “Control” in his *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, buys into Foucault’s understanding of contemporary society as networked, but he does not believe we have much to gain by understanding it as a disciplinary society; rather, Rose proposes that we live, work, and breathe as a control society: “Rather than being confined, like its subjects, to a succession of institutional sites, the control of conduct was now immanent to all the places in which deviation could occur, inscribed into the dynamics of the practices into which human beings are connected.” We no longer need hospitals, schools, asylums or prisons to monitor and correct our activities; instead, our way of being in the world is now personally connected. We are a society of self-policing (by prompt of none other than the everyday networks in which we partake) risk managers: “Conduct is continually monitored and reshaped by logics immanent within all networks of practice. Surveillance is ‘designed in’ to the flows of everyday existence” (234). Rose challenges Foucault by suggesting that, in a control society, power is more potent, more dangerous, even. Rather than an institution using disciplinary intervention to correct deviant individuals, control societies work on the premise of regulation. This makes power more “effective,” according to Rose, “because changing individuals is difficult and ineffective—and it also makes power less obtrusive—thus diminishing its political and moral fallout. It also makes resistance more
difficult . . . [;] actuarial practices . . . minimize the possibilities for resistance in the name of . . . identity.” In a control society, deviants are targeted as a collective, and techniques of control, rather than those of discipline, are meant to preempt crime and risk (236). Foucault did not get it quite right, says Rose, because “. . . the idea of a maximum security society is misleading. Rather than the tentacles of the state spreading across everyday life, the securitization of identity is dispersed and is organized. And rather than totalizing surveillance, it is better seen as conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility, constant scrutiny of the right of individuals to access certain kinds of flows of consumption of goods” (243). We are our own tentacles of surveillance; we grant our own access to being, knowledge, and power.

Rose (1999) eloquently sums up his argument in the following quotation:

In a society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the fabric of existence itself, into the organization of space, time, visibility, circuits of communication. And these enwrap each individual life decision and action—about labour, purchases, debts, credits, lifestyle, sexual contracts and the like—in a web of incitements, rewards, current sanctions and foreboding of future sanctions which serve to enjoin citizens to maintain particular types of control over their conduct. These assemblages which entail the securitization of identity are not unified, but dispersed, not hierarchical but rhizomatic, not totalized but connected in a web or relays and relations. (246)

In addition to clarifying Rose’s understanding of how individuals instate their own risk management (a new form of “surveillance”) in noncentered, nonhierarchical (non-institutionally-sponsored) networks, this quotation also highlights the significant issue of visibility, or, rather, invisibility of said networks, which is picked up by Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.*
Agamben (1998) calls for the replacement of Foucault’s prison metaphor with the idea of the “camp” and suggests that “the camp as dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities” (175). The camp is hidden, more ubiquitous than we recognize, and it is the camp as social construct, the camp as paradigm of contemporary existence, that should capture our attention because “it would be more honest and, above all, more useful to investigate carefully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that no act committed against them could appear any longer as a crime” (171). Agamben here argues that power, and the flow of power through networks and its capacity to construct reality, should be discussed in terms of “homo sacer.”

“Homo sacer” is “sacred man” and is analogous to a bandit, a werewolf, a colossus and refugee (something that is always already two things in one). It is someone who is stripped of the laws of citizenship and can be killed by anyone for any reason without penalty but, at the same time, that person cannot be sacrificed. It is someone who is removed of all sanctions of the law except the rule that banished that person in the first place. Homo sacer represents inbetweenness with possibility. It is to be a Mobius strip, “the very impossibility of distinguishing between outside and inside, nature and exception, physis and nomos” (Agamben 1998, 37). Perhaps the most significant statement Agamben makes about homo sacer is that “if today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually hominess sacri”;
we are all homo sacer (115). Agamben, here, is deliberately augmenting Foucault by addressing the power of law. If the government denies a place for the refugee in contemporary society, and we are all refugees, where does that leave us? (132-33). We should be alarmed by such a realization, Agamben argues, because “in the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (169; emphasis added). Agamben sees permenancy in the camp metaphor, and we can see affinities between what Agamben has to say and what Rose has to say when Agamben states that “in this sense, our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the people that is excluded” (179). We might bring in Rose to ask, then, whether we are self-destructive in our self-policing: “It was more accurately understood as a blurring of the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the system of social control, and a widening of the net of control whose mesh simultaneously became finer and whose boundaries became more invisible as it spread to encompass smaller and smaller violations of the normative order” (238). Rose readily admits that there are “insiders” and “outsiders,” processes of “inclusion” and “exclusion,” in a control society, and “it appears as if outside the communities of inclusion exists an array of micro-sectors, micro-cultures of non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens, consisting of those who are unable or unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk, incapable of exercising responsible self-government, attached either to no moral community or to a community of anti-morality” (259). What is at stake in heeding
Agamben’s ontological call to notice the camps in contemporary society, is also about recognizing our precarious status as permanent homo sacri at risk of being (self-) shoved out of a network of privileged “citizens” in our society to a network or counterpublic of delinquent and at risk non-citizens. Yet, to complicate our understanding of our being in our postmodern world even further, Manuel DeLanda and Bruno Latour ask us to take our focus away from people, per se.

DeLanda (2006), in *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity*, specifically wants to argue that theories of social ontology should not be in the business of arguing for seeing the world through a particular metaphor; the contemporary world is far too complex for that. Rather, his theory of assemblages offers “a sense of the irreducible social complexity characterizing the contemporary world” (6). DeLanda argues that far too many theorists have tried to put forward “organic totalities” based on “relations of interiority” in which “the component parts are constituted by the very relations they have to other parts in the whole” (9). This means fitting parts to predetermined wholes, and this produces a false notion of a “seamless web” (10). DeLanda works from Deleuze to offer a theory based on relations of exteriority in which network parts are autonomous and can be plugged into different networks for different outcomes; and, importantly, “the properties of the component parts can never explain the relations which constitute the whole” (10-11). Another important feature of assemblages (the term DeLanda uses for “networks” to account for their foundational property of being emergent) is that assemblages can be described on two specific axes: parts play material or expressive roles and are involved in processes that can territorialize or
deterritorialize (18-19). The important difference between material and expressive roles is that the expressive role cannot be reduced to language and symbols. For example, there may be the material content of a discussion but also the bodily expression of attendant cues. Material and expressive functions can be exercised individually or together and at different places and times by the same “parts” of an assemblage. Similarly, to “territorialize” is a part’s process of stabilizing a network, while to “deterritorialize” is to destabilize a network, and “one and the same assemblage can have components working to stabilize its identity as well as components forcing it to change or even transforming it into a different assemblage” (12). Coding and decoding are also discussed as important variables of assemblages. Coding, which can be performed by genes or words, works to further stabilize the identity of assemblages, while decoding does the opposite and allows for further expression of personal convictions and styles (15-16). DeLanda emphasizes that all of these processes are recurrent (16), assemblages account for nonlinear results (20), and that an assemblage can affect its parts retroactively (34).

What we gain from DeLanda (2006) is an understanding that it is important to look at the links that (however temporarily) bind the assemblage or network rather than the “parts” themselves, necessarily: “It is the pattern of recurring links, as well as the properties of those links, which forms the subject of study, not the attributes of the persons occupying positions in a network” (56). DeLanda is not interested in essences, and he is not interested in natural kinds. He is interested in possibilities: “The notion of the structure of a space of possibilities is crucial in assemblage theory given that, unlike properties, the capacities of an assemblage are not given, that is, they are merely possible
when not exercised. But the set of possible capacities of an assemblage is not amorphous, however open-ended it may be, since different assemblages exhibit different set of capacities” (29). It is not about what humans think of the world but about describing how the world organizes itself at any given (perpetually dynamic) moment.

One might argue that Bruno Latour (2005a) is even more vocal in highlighting the “world” as actor upon itself (regardless of human interpretation of that acting and their part in it). In “From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public,” Latour states, “In other words, objects—taken as so many issues—bind all of us in ways that map out a public space profoundly different from what is usually recognized under the label of “the political”” (15). Latour is clearly interested in doing away with any notions of a modernist, foundational truth when he says “we don’t assemble because we agree, look alike, feel good, are socially compatible or wish to fuse together but because we are brought by divisive matters of concern into some neutral, isolated place in order to come to some sort of provisional makeshift (dis)agreement” (23). Further, in Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, Latour (2005b) describes this “coming together” as “concatenations of mediators”: “Action is not done under the full control of consciousness; action should rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly disentangled” (59). Latour’s view, “action” runs haphazardly among humans and objects in contemporary localized networks (75). Yes, says Latour, “. . . any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor—or, if it has no figuration yet, an actant” (71). DeLanda and Latour are ultimately after similar things; they seek to challenge any sort of social
ontological theory that is not emergent. Both DeLanda and Latour find that “being” in the world is best described in the rise and fall of action, in the links as they are in the processes of linking, and that our ontological understanding must include objects as veritable actors; things impact that network just as much as people do, and it is the process of “impacting” that we should be interested in.

So why, as composition teachers, should we be concerned with how our way of being in the world is differently described from modernism to postmodernism? Because ontological understanding has a direct impact on how knowledge is created and circulated through texts. Such ontological postmodern developments have helped us come to understand the “death” of the singular author. Foucault (1984c) confirms that “criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance—or death—of the author some time ago. But the consequences of their discovery of it have not been sufficiently examined, nor has its import been accurately measured” (103).

Ijessling (1976) is particularly helpful in briefly but effectively summing up the transformation in thoughts on subjectivity and authorship from modern to postmodern times. The first and oldest or most “modern” (in the sense of “modernist” rather than “contemporary”) understanding of authorship suggested that “the author as subject is the autonomous and irreducible origin and master of his own monological speech.” In other words, the author (in the romantic sense) was the individual genius behind the concrete work reproduced. In a second and later sense, authorship was considered the product of dialogue: “Subjectivities come about in one’s being spoken to by others and in speaking to others” (132). This view suggested that since speakers and writers are constantly
discoursing, it is difficult if not impossible to locate an irreducible, singular source. The third, most postmodern sense and the definition that has direct connections to the ways in which Latour and others call for viewing our contemporary disposition of being in the world comprises intertextuality. Intertextuality “conceives all that one says as a fabric woven into a much wider network of interrelated texts with references to each other. The speaker or writer is also woven into this fabric.” In this sense, it is clearly impossible to suggest that an “author” originates a work; rather, the author and his or her words are “carried along by the network of words in circulation.” “Authors” are no longer considered to “own” words; instead, the author is considered to be a product of the larger circulation of narratives (133). “Literary output,” according to Ijessling, can be defined “not as the work of an author, but as a web of meanings. On the one hand, it results from a network of previous arguments and assertions and, on the other hand, it opens up unlimited possibilities of new arguments and texts” (132). The same networked logic that defines our general ontological sense of being in the world also defines the way in which texts (with implications for knowledge and power) are produced and circulate in the world: “At the pinnacle of contemporary production, information and communication are the very commodities produced; the network itself is the site of both production and circulation” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 298).

This paper has been an exercise in acknowledging the significant changes that have occurred on a theoretical level in our understanding of how society functions from modern to postmodern times; this paper has also shown how these changes are paralleled in our understanding of what it means to “write” in a contemporary world. So, when Lisa
Ede and Andrea Lunsford (2001) among others ask us to pay attention to the fact that said theories do not align with the pedagogies we practice in our contemporary composition classrooms, I think we need to pay attention.¹ If we, as composition teachers, are charged with teaching our students how to effectively communicate in “writing” (which now involves a multitude of modalities beyond the “print” that dominated modernism), we need to get with the “networked” program; as we have seen in this paper, it is, indeed, power that is at stake. We are not just teaching our students how to “write”; we are teaching our students how they might consciously work within these networks and gain some control of whether they will be included or excluded in power-filled and power-constituted postmodern world. Perhaps the “story” of “student empowerment” may be considered cliché, but what seems more apparent than ever is that in a postmodern world full of homo sacri and “camps,” being a “good” writer has greater consequences than ever.

¹ Ede and Lunsford (2001) note that we all agree that writing is inherently social, yet we still rely on individualistic praxis; we still ascribe to pedagogies that encourage the independent author producing concrete (original, honest and “truthful”) works.
References


