Literacy and the Politics of Education by C. H. Knoblauch


Literacy is one of those mischievous concepts, like virtuousness and craftsmanship, that appear to denote capacities but that actually convey value judgments. It is rightly viewed, Linda Brodkey has noted, "as a social trope" and its sundry definitions "as cultural Rorschachs" (47). The labels literate and illiterate almost always imply more than a degree or deficiency of skill. They are, grossly or subtly, sociocultural judgments laden with approbation, disapproval, or pity about the character and place, the worthiness and prospects, of persons and groups. A revealing exercise would be to catalog the definitions of literacy that lie explicit or implicit in the pages of this collection, definitions that motivate judgments, political no less than scholarly, about which people belong in literate and illiterate categories; the numbers in each group; why and in what ways literacy is important; what should be done for or about those who are not literate or are less literate than others; and who has the power to say so. It would be quickly apparent that there is no uniformity of view, since the values that surround reading and writing abilities differ from argument to argument. Instead, there are competing views, responsive to the agendas of those who characterize the ideal.

Invariably, definitions of literacy are also rationalizations of its importance. Furthermore, they are invariably offered by the literate, constituting, therefore, implicit rationalizations of the importance of literate people, who are powerful (the reasoning goes) because they are literate and, as such, deserving of power.

The concept of literacy is embedded, then, in the ideological dispositions of those who use the concept, those who profit from it, and those who have the standing and motivation to enforce it as a social requirement. It is obviously not a cultural value in all times and places; when Sequoya brought his syllabic writing system to the Cherokee, their first inclination was to put him to death for dabbling in an evil magic. The majority of the world's languages have lacked alphabets, though they have nonetheless articulated rich oral traditions in societies that have also produced many other varieties of cultural achievement. To be sure, there is ready agreement, at least among the literate, about the necessity of literacy in the so-called modern world; this agreement is reinforced by explanations that
typically imply a more developed mode of existence among literate people. I. J. Gelb has
written, for instance: "As language distinguishes man from animal, so writing distinguishes
civilized man from barbarian," going on to point out that "an illiterate person cannot expect
to participate successfully in human progress, and what is true of individuals is also true of
any group of individuals, social strata, or ethnic units" (221-22). This argument offers a
common and pernicious half-truth, representing the importance of literacy, which is
unquestionable, in absolutist and ethnocentric terms.

However, if literacy today is perceived as a compelling value, the reason lies not in
such self-interested justifications but in its continuing association with forms of social reality
that depend on its primacy. During the Middle Ages, clerks were trained to read and write so
that they could keep accounts for landowners, merchants, and government officials.
Bureaucratic documentation was not conceived so that people could acquire literacy.
Christian missionaries in nineteenth-century Africa spread literacy so that people could read
the Bible; they did not teach the Bible so that the illiterate could become readers and writers.
There is no question that literacy is necessary to survival and success in the contemporary
world--a world where the literate claim authority to set the terms of survival and success, a
world that reading and writing abilities have significantly shaped in the first place. But it is
important to regard that necessity in the context of political conditions that account for it, or
else we sacrifice the humanizing understanding that life can be otherwise than the way we
happen to know it and that people who are measured positively by the yardstick of literacy
enjoy their privileges because of their power to choose and apply that instrument on their
own behalf, not because of their point of development or other innate worthiness. Possessing
that understanding, educators in particular but other citizens as well may advance their
agendas for literacy with somewhat less likelihood of being blinded by the light of their own
benevolence to the imperial designs that may lurk in the midst of their compassion.

In the United States today, several arguments about the nature and importance of
literacy vie for power in political and educational life. Sketching the more popular arguments
may remind us of the extent to which definitions of the concept incorporate the social
agendas of the definers, serving the needs of the nonliterate only through the mediation of
someone's vision of the way the world should be. Literacy never stands alone in these
perspectives as a neutral denoting of skills; it is always literacy for something--for
professional competence in a technological world, for civic responsibility and the
preservation of heritage, for personal growth and self-fulfillment, for social and political
change. The struggle of any one definition to dominate the others entails no merely casual or
arbitrary choice of values, nor does it allow for a conflating of alternatives in some grand
compromise or list of cumulative benefits. At stake are fundamentally different perceptions
of social reality; the nature of language and discourse; the importance of culture, history, and
tradition; the functions of schools, as well as other commitments, few of which are regarded
as negotiable. At the same time, since no definition achieves transcendent authority, their
dialectical interaction offers a context of choices within which continually changing
educational and other social policies find their justification. The process of choosing is
visible every day, for better and worse, in legislative assemblies, television talk shows,
newspaper editorials, and classrooms throughout the country.

The most familiar literacy argument comes from the functionalist perspective, with its
appealingly pragmatic emphasis on readying people for the necessities of daily life--writing
checks, reading sets of instructions--as well as for the professional tasks of a complex
technological society. Language abilities in this view are often represented by the metaphors
of information theory: language is a code that enables the sending of messages and the
processing of information. The concern of a functionalist perspective is the efficient
transmission of useful messages in a value-neutral medium. Basic-skill and technical-writing
programs in schools, many on-the-job training programs in business and industry, and the
training programs of the United States military--all typically find their rationalization in the
argument for functional literacy, in each case presuming that the ultimate value of language
lies in its utilitarian capacity to pass information back and forth for economic or other
material gain.

The functionalist argument has the advantage of tying literacy to concrete needs,
appearing to promise socioeconomic benefit to anyone who can achieve the appropriate
minimal competency. But it has a more hidden advantage as well, at least from the standpoint
of those whose literacy is more than minimal: it safeguards the socioeconomic status quo.
Whatever the rhetoric of its advocates concerning the "self-determined objectives" (Hunter
and Harman 7) of people seeking to acquire skills, functionalism serves the world as it is,
inviting outsiders to enter that world on the terms of its insiders by fitting themselves to roles
that they are superficially free to choose but that have been prepared as a range of acceptable alternatives. Soldiers will know how to repair an MX missile by reading the field manual but will not question the use of such weapons because of their reading of antimilitarist philosophers; clerks will be able to fill out and file their order forms but will not therefore be qualified for positions in higher management. Functionalist arguments presume that a given social order is right simply because it exists, and their advocates are content to recommend the training of persons to take narrowly beneficial places in that society. The rhetoric of technological progressivism is often leavened with a mixture of fear and patriotism (as in *A Nation at Risk*) in order to defend a social program that maintains managerial classes--whose members are always more than just functionally literate--in their customary places while outfitting workers with the minimal reading and writing skills needed for usefulness to the modern information economy.

Cultural literacy offers another common argument about the importance of reading and writing, one frequently mounted by traditionalist educators but sustained in populist versions as well, especially among people who feel insecure about their own standing and their future prospects when confronted by the volatile mix of ethnic heritages and socioeconomic interests that make up contemporary American life. The argument for cultural literacy moves beyond a mechanist conception of basic skills and toward an affirmation of supposedly stable and timeless cultural values inscribed in the verbal memory--in particular, the canonical literature of Western European society. Its reasoning is that true literacy entails more than technical proficiency, a minimal ability to make one's way in the world; that literacy also includes an awareness of cultural heritage, a capacity for higher-order thinking, even some aesthetic discernment, faculties not automatically available to the encoders and decoders of the functionalist perspective. Language is no mere tool in this view but is, rather, a repository of cultural values and to that extent a source of social cohesion. To guard the vitality of the language, the advocates of cultural literacy say, citizens must learn to speak and write decorously, as well as functionally, and must also read great books, where the culture is enshrined. In some popular versions of cultural literacy, English is regarded as the only truly American language and is, therefore, the appropriate medium of commerce and government. The economic self-interest that pervades the functionalist perspective frequently gives way here to jingoistic protectionism; cultural literacy advocates presume that the
salvation of some set of favored cultural norms or language practices lies necessarily in the marginalizing or even extinction of others.

The argument for cultural literacy often presents itself within a myth of the fall from grace: Language and, by extension, culture once enjoyed an Edenlike existence but are currently degenerating because of internal decay and sundry forces of barbarism. People no longer read, write, or think with the strength of insight of which they were once capable. They no longer remember and, therefore, no longer venerate. The age of high culture has passed; minds and characters have been weakened by television or rock music or the 1960s. The reasons vary, but the message is clear: unless heritage is protected, the former purity of language reconstituted, the past life of art and philosophy retrieved, we risk imminent cultural decay. However extravagant such predictions appear to unbelievers, there is no mistaking the melancholy energy of contemporary proponents of cultural literacy or, if we are to judge from the recent best-seller lists, the number of solemn citizens--anxious perhaps about recent influxes of Mexicans, Vietnamese, and other aliens--who take their warnings to heart.

Arguments for cultural and functional literacy plainly dominate the American imagination at the moment and for obvious reasons. They articulate the needs, hopes, anxieties, and frustrations of the conservative temper. They reveal in different ways the means of using an ideal of literacy to preserve and advance the world as it is, a world in which the interests of traditionally privileged groups dominate the interests of the traditionally less privileged. Schools reflect such conservatism to the extent that they view themselves as agencies for preserving established institutions and values, not to mention the hierarchical requirements of the American economy. But still other arguments, if not quite so popular, reflect the priorities and the agendas of liberal and even radical ideologies struggling to project their altered visions of social reality, seeking their own power over others under the banner of literacy. The liberal argument, for instance, emphasizes literacy for personal growth, finding voice in the process-writing movement in American high schools or in the various practices of personalized learning. The liberal argument has been successful, up to a point, in schools because it borrows from long-hallowed American myths of expressive freedom and boundless individual opportunity, romantic values to which schools are obliged to pay at least lip service even when otherwise promoting more authoritarian curricula.
The assumption of a literacy-for-personal-growth argument is that language expresses the power of the individual imagination, so that nurturing a person’s reading and writing abilities enables the development of that power, thereby promoting the progress of society through the progress of the individual learner. The political agenda behind this liberalism tends to be educational and other social change; its concern for personal learning draws attention to school practices that supposedly thwart the needs of individual students or that disenfranchise some groups of students in the interest of maintaining the values of the status quo. The kinds of change that the personal-growth argument recommends are, on the whole, socially tolerable because they are moderate in character: let students read enjoyable novels, instead of basal reader selections; let young women and young Hispanics find images of themselves in schoolwork, not just images of white males. Using the rhetoric of moral sincerity, the personal-growth argument speaks compassionately on behalf of the disadvantaged. Meanwhile, it avoids for the most part, the suggestion of any fundamental restructuring of institutions, believing that the essential generosity and fair-mindedness of American citizens will accommodate some liberalization of outmoded curricula and an improved quality of life for the less privileged as long as fundamental political and economic interests are not jeopardized. Frequently, Americans do hear such appeals, though always in the context of an implicit agreement that nothing important is going to change. Accordingly, advocates of expressive writing, personalized reading programs, whole-language curricula, and open classrooms have been permitted to carry out their educational programs, with politicians and school officials quick to realize the ultimate gain in administrative control that comes from allowing such modest symbols of self-determination to release built-up pressures of dissatisfaction.

A fourth argument substantially to the left of personal growth is one that Henry Giroux, among others, calls critical literacy (226). Critical literacy is a radical perspective whose adherents, notably Paulo Freire, have been influential primarily in the third world, especially Latin America. Strongly influenced by Marxist philosophical premises, critical literacy is not a welcome perspective in this country, and it finds voice currently in only a few academic enclaves, where it exists more as a facsimile of oppositional culture than as a practice, and in an even smaller number of community-based literacy projects which are typically concerned with adult learners. Its agenda is to identify reading and writing abilities
with a critical consciousness of the social conditions in which people find themselves, recognizing the extent to which language practices objectify and rationalize these conditions and the extent to which people with authority to name the world dominate others whose voices they have been able to suppress. Literacy, therefore, constitutes a means to power, a way to seek political enfranchisement—not with the naive expectation that merely being literate is sufficient to change the distribution of prerogatives but with the belief that the ability to speak alone enables entrance to the arena in which power is contested. At stake, from this point of view, is, in principle, the eventual reconstituting of the class structure of American life, specifically a change of those capitalist economic practices that assist the dominance of particular groups.

For that reason, if for no other, such a view of literacy will remain suspect as a theoretical enterprise and will be considered dangerous, perhaps to the point of illegality, in proportion to its American adherents’ attempts to implement it practically in schools and elsewhere. The scholarly right has signaled this institutional hostility in aggressive attacks on Jonathan Kozol's *Illiterate America*, the most popular American rendering of critical-literacy arguments, for its supposedly inaccurate statistics about illiteracy and in calculatedly patronizing Kozol's enthusiasm for radical change. Meanwhile, although critical literacy is trendy in some academic circles, those who commend it also draw their wages from the capitalist economy it is designed to challenge. Whether its advocates will take Kozol's risks in bringing so volatile a practice into community schools is open to doubt. Whether something important would change if they did take the risks is also doubtful. Whether, if successful, they would still approve a world in which their own privileges were withheld may be more doubtful still. In any case, one can hardly imagine NCTE or the MLA, let alone the Department of Education, formally sanctioning such a fundamental assault on their own institutional perquisites.

Definitions of literacy could be multiplied far beyond these popular arguments. But enumerating others would only belabor my point, which is that no definition tells, with ontological or objective reliability, what literacy is; definitions only tell what some person or group—motivated by political commitment—wants or needs literacy to be. What makes any such perspective powerful is the ability of its adherents to make it invisible or at least, transparent—a window on the world, revealing simple and stable truths—so that the only
problem still needing to be addressed is one of implementation: how best to make the world--other people--conform to that prevailing vision. At the same time, what makes an ideology visible as such and, therefore, properly limited in its power to compel unconscious assent is critical scrutiny, the only safeguard people have if they are to be free of the designs of others. To the extent that literacy advocates of one stripe or another remain unconscious of or too comfortable with those designs, their offerings of skills constitute a form of colonizing, a benign but no less mischievous paternalism that rationalizes the control of others by representing it as a means of liberation. To the extent that the nonliterate allow themselves to be objects of someone else's "kindness," they will find no power in literacy, however it is defined, but only altered terms of dispossession. When, for instance, the memberships of U.S. English and English First, totaling around half a million citizens, argue for compulsory English, they may well intend the enfranchisement of those whose lack of English-language abilities has depressed their economic opportunities. But they also intend the extinction of cultural values inscribed in languages other than their own and held to be worthwhile by people different from themselves. In this or any other position on literacy, its advocates, no less than its intended beneficiaries, need to hear--for all our sakes--a critique of whatever assumptions and beliefs are fueling their passionate benevolence.

WORKS CITED